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3Abstract:  This article approaches the issue of securities regulation starting with an 
examination of the nature and role of markets and financial markets.  It next outlines the 
various arguments for and against regulation, and then looks at approaches taken by 
markets and their regulators.  The approaches are government regulation, self-regulation 
and co-regulation, and the structural changes via demutualization and corporate 
governance. With this background, it turns to examine how these approaches have played 
out in the markets themselves.  The article surveys the regulatory aspects of the ASX, 
NYSE and the SGX, and reviews the regulatory and financial performance of the markets.  
It concludes that the transitioning occurring in markets is not yet complete, and that 
there remains considerable research to be done. 
41) INTRODUCTION 
 
Richard Grasso, the former head of the New York Stock Exchange has been sued by the 
New York Attorney General for the return of up to $209 million1 of his compensation.  
This compensation forms part of his retirement package and represents his remuneration 
for functioning as the head watchdog of the self-regulating NYSE.  By way of 
comparison, the top ten executives of publicly traded corporations in the world were paid 
an average of $59 million for the year 2003.2 Clearly, there are many issues in the case, 
only one of which is appropriate levels of executive compensation, but it leads to a 
broader consideration of the structure, role, appropriate means and level of regulation.   
 
New York  vs. Grasso et al.3 promises to be an interesting investigation and analysis of 
what appears to be a classic case of the fox guarding the henhouse.  The case is likely to 
be decided on the basis of whether the board was following proper procedures, had 
proper disclosure and properly informed itself as to the compensation package the head 
of the exchange.4 As Professor Joseph Grundfest of the Stanford Law School and former 
Commissioner of the Securities Exchange Commission observed, the Attorney General is 
alleging that the board of the NYSE “was utterly unable to exercise its fiduciary 
 
1 Joseph Grundfest, “How Much is Too Much?”, NY Times 28 May 2004 observes that depending on how 
one does the calculations the compensation package could be seen as $139.5, $187.5, or $209.2 million. 
2 Calculation based on data provided in Table “Top Earners of 2003” in Forbes Magazine “Executive Pay” 
10 May 2004, http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2004/0510/124.html
3 People of the State of New York, by Eliot Spitzer, the Attorney General of the State of New York vs. 
Richard A. Grasso, Kenneth G. Langone and The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Filed May 24, 2004. 
Pleadings at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nys/nygrasso52404cmp.pdf
4 Grundfest, ibid. 
5obligations because it was misinformed and ignorant of the material facts.”5 Grundfest is 
of the opinion that the director of the NYSE has a fiduciary obligation to the board to 
ensure it understood the compensation package.  He suggests that this obligation is 
particularly significant because of the conflict of self-interest involved in the matter at 
issue.   
 
Not only does the NYSE set the world standard at least for regulation of the stock 
exchanges but the case will be particularly important because there is an increasing 
recognition of the interconnectedness of stock exchanges and the critical need to study 
them comparatively.6 As such, it is important to study the problem posed by the Grasso 
Affair, and to consider possible effects and implications on other exchanges including the 
ASX.   
 
This paper is a consideration of the regulation of stock markets.  It poses the question: if 
securities markets are to be regulated, is there a better way to do so? To answer this 
question, it is necessary to understand the nature and role of markets in society.  Next 
some consideration of the assumptions and purposes of regulation by those party to the 
debate is critical.  In simple terms, the issue is finding a way to preserve the socio-
economic benefits of stock markets while controlling the damage their failures can cause.   
 
5 Ibid. 
6 James Angel, “The Evolving Regulation of Financial Networks,” Chap. in  Charles Sutfcliffe and Stephen 
Wells, Transparency and Fragmentation: Financial Market Regulation in a Dynamic Environment (2002) 
262.  Note that this comparative study of regulation is not conclusive, for although some regulation 
scholars claim that different cultures prefer different types of regulation, others do not.  Neil Gunningham, 
Peter Grabosky with Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Oxford Socio-
legal Studies (1998) 155, n. 78.  an interesting step in this direction from an international relations 
perspective is, Andrew Sobel, “Breaching the Levee, Waiting for the Flood: Testing Beliefs about the 
Internationalization of the Securities Markets.” (1994) 19 International Interactions 311-338. 
6As we shall see, there is a broad spectrum of approaches to the issue ranging from 
completely free private markets to completely controlled government markets, and of 
course, a number of intermediary positions.  Another way of approaching the issue 
focuses on how market operators themselves are structured.  Some are mutual entities, 
others are for profit corporations, while yet others are governmental or quasi-
governmental bodies.   
 
Each of these different structures has significance in terms of how easily and to what 
extent a government can control the operations of the market, the level of disclosure 
about market activities that can be demanded, and the accountability of the individuals 
involved in the market’s operation.  This paper will examine both the regulatory and 
structural aspects of three different markets and to the extent possible, examine the 
efficacy of the regulatory schema and structure on the performance of the market in terms 
of the market’s ability to attract capital, and hypothesized ability to avoid scandal. 
 
The paper begins with an analysis of objectives of markets generally, then turns to an 
examination of the specific objectives of markets both from a corporate perspective and 
from the perspective of the individuals involved, and the problems created by combining 
those objectives.  It will then review regulatory theory and the related approaches to the 
regulation of the markets.  Next, it will turn to examine three equity markets: the SGX, 
the ASX and the NYSE.  The comparison will extend from the structure and rules of the 
exchanges, to a brief analysis of the financial performance of each of the respective 
7markets.  Finally, it will conclude with some recommendations which if followed may 
help to avoid a repetition of the Grasso Affair and other similar market failures. 
 
2) MARKETS GENERALLY  
 
At a most basic level, markets permit storage of value and allocation of resources as 
between current and future needs.7 An established market—i.e. marketplace, with known 
traders and rules8—improves the trading process, in terms of speed, and lowering 
transaction costs.9 In a capitalist economy, access to capital is vital to increase production 
and to increase the goods available to members in society.  Traditionally, markets have 
been mutual entities—that is owned by the users.  As the parties most interested in the 
operation of the market and with a strong desire to influence how the market is run—
given the need to protect their interests—a mutual organization has worked well in 
allowing member-users to achieve those objectives.10 
a) Financial Markets 
 The financial markets form the backbone of capitalist economies, assuring liquidity, the 
existence of primary and secondary markets, and permitting capital formation.11 
Financial markets help producers access capital and help investors by providing 
improved investment opportunities.12 
7 Robert Kolb and Ricardo Rodriguez, Financial Markets, (1996) 10-11. 
8 Angel, 268. 
9 Kolb and Rodrigues above n. 7. 
10 Angel above n. 6, 262-265. 
11 John Carson, “Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation: Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully 
Manage Them?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3183, Dec. 2003, 1-2. 
12 Hendrick Houthakker and Peter Williamson, The Economics of Financial Markets, (1996), 111-112. 
8A financial market, writes James Angel, a leading market scholar “consists of one or 
more trading platforms, in addition to a very thick rule book.” 13 In order to make 
financial markets function effectively, certain additional elements must be in place.  
Particularly, it must be inviting to potential investors by ensuring that its “participants act 
with integrity and [that] there is adequate disclosure to facilitate informed judgments.”14 
This approach is referred to by one author as the “twin pillar” approach: where the 
participants are regulated and disclosure mandatory.15 This approach in turn serves an 
important purpose of facilitating transparency that too further improves the market.16 
Mutual organization worked well enough in the less competitive climate in which the 
world’s equity markets operated amicably in relative isolation prior to the tremendous 
drop in the costs of telecommunications.  Traditionally, like most markets, these equity 
markets were owned the stockbrokers who used their services.17 Once 
telecommunications became dramatically cheaper, however, the markets came to view 
each other as competitors, and a move to improve efficiency and facilitate more rapid 
management responses was necessary.  Some scholars, as well as a former chairperson of 
the NYSE, argue that making these changes required taking power from the vested 
 
13 Angel above n. 6, 268. 
14 Commonwealth of Australia, Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) 16, quoted in Robert Baxt, 
Ashley Black, and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law (2003), 3. 
15 Baxt ibid. 
16 John Board, Charles Sutfcliffe and Stephen Wells, Transparency and Fragmentation: Financial Market 
Regulation in a Dynamic Environment (2002) 228-230. 
17 Angel above n. 6, 265.  Noted also in Frank Donnan, “Self-regulation and the Demutualization of the 
Australian Stock Exchange,” (1999) 10 AJCL 1, 2. Donnan observes that the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) as an exception to this general tradition, noting that the LSE was a for-profit joint stock company by 
the terms of its Deed of Settlement in 1802. Ibid, 2. 
9interests of the individual stockbrokers18 and putting power into the hands of others.  The 
key questions, of course, are: how much power, how to control the power and to which 
others should that control be given?  The answers, as we shall see, are decidedly varied 
and include permutations which include the government, new corporate vehicles, 
individual non-trader investors, and a whole host of other ideas. 
 
One increasingly dominant answer has been demutualization. The creation of for profit 
exchanges permitted “the right of access to the… markets became distinct from the rights 
of ownership of the [market].”19 This demutualization in some ways exacerbates the 
distinct market functions of operating the trading platform and the rule book control and 
sharpens the conflict between the business and regulatory functions necessary for a sound 
financial market.20 The for profit platform operator seeks to avoid competition, 
maximize fees from its dominant market position, maximize its network effect,21 while 
keeping the level of dishonesty to an “acceptable” or “reasonable” level.22 The regulator 
seeks to increase competition, keep barriers to entry low and keep dishonesty at a 
minimum23 “maintaining competition and protecting investors.”24 This approach to 
markets will be discussed in more depth later in the paper. 
 
18 Angel, ibid.  See also D. Oesterle, D. Winslow and S. Anderson, "The New York Stock Exchange and Its 
Outmoded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?" (1992) 17 (2) The Journal of 
Corporation Law 223, and Donnan, ibid, 5. 
19 Baxt above n. 14, 274. 
20 Angel above n. 6, 271. 
21 World Exchanges: Global Industry Outlook and Investment Analysis (2004), 2. 
22 Historically, the evidence is that markets can function with a fairly high level of dishonesty.  (Consider, 
for example, the South Sea Bubble, and the train of scandals leading ultimately to securities legislation 
were never able to destroy the financial market.) What is reasonable in this context, arguably, is the amount 
of dishonesty that does not impede the market’s ability to attract traders and customers. 
23 Angel above n. 6, 271-271. 
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The peculiar problem for equity markets, indeed what justifies their very existence, is the 
information problem associated with equities.  Whereas most other commodities are 
rather easily valued; the value of equities is determined by information about the 
particulars of the security.25 Part of that information is determined by the activities of 
other traders and owners with respect to the equity.  Accordingly, access to information 
and price discovery is a prime motivator for the creation of and participation in an equity 
market. By forcing equal disclosure from market participants, the market effectively 
protects and benefits all traders.26 Access to correct, complete, and timely information is 
critical for the ethereal but all important investor confidence.   
 
b) Interests of Parties 
It is important to identify the interests of the market’s participants.  Economists advise 
that the individual market participants have no interest except self-interest.  The 
foregoing statement, however clear, obvious, and apparently self-explanatory, likely 
hides as much as it reveals.  What is the particular self-interest: is it merely turning a 
profit?  An affirmative answer betrays a facile understanding of human nature.  People 
are interested in a myriad of things and a rather complex set of motivations drive them to 
make certain decisions.  People long for prestige, for example, by making large trades, 
 
24 Houthakker above n. 12, 285.  Described in the literature emanating from the UK as “orderly conduct 
and investor protection” Board above n. 16 et al. xi. 
25 The matter of information in the role of equity markets is the subject of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
Essentially, the hypothesis is focused on the role of information in the markets and particularly how and 
when it gets incorporated into the price of the equity.  See Houthakker, above n. 12, 130-141. 
26 Angel, above n. 6, 269-70. 
11
rapid trades, unexpected trades, risky trades. Examples of the role of individuals and their 
idiosyncratic motivations abound in the literature concerning market collapses.27 
People like to challenge themselves and to compete with others.  In the case of the 
market, people will test how far a system or set of rules can be stretched.  As well, they 
will challenge their intellect and creativity and so will endeavour to see whether they can 
avoid detection of questionable activity.  For example, although all three exchanges 
examined in this study run sophisticated computer programs28 to detect irregularities, 
surely people will continue to attempt to avoid detection for the sake of doing so. Finally 
people are motivated by their relationships.  While things like prestige and competition 
are aspects of those relationships, there is also the cooperative, friendly aspect.  In regard 
to the exchanges, it may promote less that full enforcement in the oft-noted phenomenon 
of the regulated and the regulator coming into a symbiotic relationship denominated by 
economist Gabriel Kolko as “regulatory capture.”29 
While certainly profit is the over-riding objective of most market participants, the 
significant other motivations driving the activities of a portion of the others cannot be 
 
27 See, for example, the discussion of Enron executives in Larry E. Ribstein, “Market Vs. Regulatory 
Responses To Corporate Fraud: A Critique Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002,” (2003) 29 J. Corp. L. 1.  
Concerning the weaknesses of these common assumptions in economics, see Lola L. Lopes, “Psychology 
and Economics: Perspectives on Risk, Cooperation, and the Marketplace,” (1994) 45 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 
197, Charles R.P. Pouncy, “The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the Regulation of the 
Financial Professional,” (2002) 26 Vt. L. Rev. 263, 287 n.81 Peter J. Buckley & Malcolm Chapman, 
“Economics and Social Anthropology - Reconciling Differences,” (1996) 49 Hum. Rel. 1135-36. 
28 ASX runs SOMA: Surveillance of Market Activity, the NYSE runs its own software as does the SGX. 
29 Gabriel Kolko The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 
(1963). 
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ignored.  In fact it may be that these other motivations are the primary cause of problems 
which create the problems that regulators are trying to control.30 
c) Assumptions Concerning Markets and Their Regulation 
In studying any phenomenon, it is important to consider the assumptions being made.  
What one sees, finds and recommends in any investigation to a large degree is 
determined by the assumptions from which one is operating.31 Accordingly, it is 
important to identify the main assumptions concerning markets which frame this 
discussion made by scholars, regulators and other interested parties.  By identifying and 
raising these assumptions it is not the intention of the author to indicate his acceptance of 
the assumptions; however, to discuss and question each one is another study.  Therefore, 
after identifying the assumptions commonly made, he will question and examine only 
those assumptions which have direct bearing on the issues.   
 
In general, the main assumptions are that markets: can be regulated, may need to be 
regulated and can be regulated for a specific end.  Concerning the first of the 
assumptions, whether markets can be regulated, the assumptions are; that regulation is the 
best way to control the markets—as opposed to the free market ideology in which the 
Invisible Hand controls the market; that the costs of government regulation are 
outweighed by the benefits; that the costs will be borne by the regulator without problem 
 
30 Collapses have come about for many factors, not the least of which has been individuals.  One can 
consider the actions of Nick Leeson, Alan Bond, Michael Miliken, just to name a few individuals among 
the many who have brought chaos and ruin to both markets and market participants.  Nevertheless, some 
argument may be made that in the chemical industry at least, disasters are the result of system and not 
individual failure.  Gunningham, above n. 6, 179. 
31 This discussion is found among the Philosophers of Science, such as Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions 2nd ed. (1970) and Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (1975). 
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or shirking, and finally that in the case of a non-government regulator such a regulator 
will be as diligent in its regulation of the market as would a government regulator. 
 
Assumptions concerning non-governmental regulators are: that conflicts of interest 
created by the regulation scheme can be adequately dealt with; and, that the regulator can 
be a for-profit body and yet not devote energy to reducing or avoiding regulation to 
reduce costs.  The evidence concerning this later group of assumptions is particularly 
questionable.  Experience from the NASD, the governing body of the NASDAQ and 
from the NYSE suggests that these motivational issues have not been adequately 
addressed.32 The nature of the problem is humorously put by the head of NASDAQ “If 
there were a flag for the securities industry, it would bear the Latin motto for ‘what’s in it 
for me?’” 33 With this background discussion of the nature markets common 
assumptions complete, we turn next to examine the arguments for and against control of 
the market and methods of doing so. 
 
3) APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING THE MARKET 
a) Governments, Markets and Public Goods 
There are two basic positions a government can take vis-à-vis its financial markets.  On 
one extreme, a government could take the position that the financial market is a public 
good that should be operated and controlled by the government.  No government has 
taken this position.  It is not clear why no government has done so except perhaps as a 
result of the accidents of history, namely, that more proactive or centrally planned 
 
32 Donnan, above n. 17. 
33 Quoted in Angel above n. 6 269. 
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economies have been governed by communist governments that oppose market 
capitalism in the first place.34 Governments have operated local markets in many other 
types of commodities such as farmer’s markets and fish markets.  One could argue that 
such controls as currency controls are in effect, a government operating the money 
market, at least in respect of its own currency.  While there is considerable controversy 
over the economics of such measures, it is not clear that it is less desirable.35 Given some 
trends which will be discussed within, it may well be that governments may increase their 
intervention in financial markets to the point of operating and controlling market 
operations.   
 
On the opposite extreme, governments have recognized that completely unregulated 
markets lead to disaster. Currently, in all three jurisdictions considered, governments both 
follow and govern financial transactions from the creation of money in the central bank, 
to its distribution through the financial system including banks, to matters of credit right 
through to the administration of bankrupts.  Arguably, the only significant gap where the 
money is free from government control is in the financial market.  Still, as shall be 
discussed, government intervention and control through a regulatory response is certainly 
not without controversy. 
 
34 China has permitted stock exchanges to develop in its various cities and up until 1996, has taken few 
steps to regulate them. See, Carl E Walter and Fraser J T Howie, Privatizing China, (2003).  Its first 
securities legislation was passed in December, 1998. The first stock market was establish in 1990 in 
Shanghai, followed by Shenzhen. Roman Tomasic and Jian Fu “The Securities Law of the People’s 
Republic of China: An overview” (1999) 10 AJCL  268. 
35 Nobel Prize winner and former Chief Economist for the World Bank, Joseph  Stiglitz, acknowledges that 
while “market fundamentalists” oppose all efforts to regulate capital movement, notes how effective they 
can be and credits Malaysia’s currency controls for saving that country from the much more harmful effects 
15
There are a number of reasons a free market approach does not work.  Particularly with 
respect to financial markets, this approach fails because of a phenomenon known as a 
“network effect.”  Basically the effect is the result of interconnectedness such that those 
connected and the connector gain a disproportionate benefit from their connection, and 
such connection severely limits competition. 36 As a result, regulation is needed to avoid 
one of the classic market failures—the monopoly.37 Free markets fail for reasons of 
information asymmetries and a lack of completeness.  These two matters are inherent to 
markets and cannot be resolved at a theoretical level38 let alone on a practical level. 
Another reason for intervention in financial markets is the risk posed by a collapse.  The 
damage produced by a collapse effects not just those participating in the financial market 
but every participant in society including the government.  Accordingly, all of society has 
an interest in preventing market collapses and thus government has a role to play in 
protecting society, whether by ownership, legislation, or some type of regulation. 
 
Further, as more pensions are invested directly or indirectly in the markets, the notion of 
the market as a public good gains more currency.  The matter of public goods is the 
classic occasion for government involvement.  Public goods are considered by 
economists to be an area of market failure. Public goods are those goods which are too 
costly for individuals too provide for themselves because of the limited use they would 
make of them, involve special coordination problems, or are too difficult to sequester.  In 
 
suffered by other Asian countries in the Asian currency crisis of 1996. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its 
discontents. (2003) 122-125. 
36 Angel above n. 6, 271. 
37 Ibid. 
38 On the importance and permanence of these two market deficiencies, see  B. Greenwald and J.E. Stiglitz 
“Externalities in Economics with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets” (1986) 101 (2) Quarterly 
J. of Economics, 229-64 
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economic terms, a public good is a good that has a “non-rivalrous consumption”39 and 
“nonexcludability.”40 Non-rivalrous consumption simply means that a good can be 
consumed without depriving anyone else from being able to consume the same good.  
Information is a good example of a non-rivalrous good.  The nonexcludability aspect 
means that the costs required to make something private property, are too high to interest 
a profit-maximizing firm in attempting to do so.  In the case of the market, the costs of 
excluding others have been sufficiently offset by the profits made in operating the 
markets—in fact, the profits from control are so great that they have created the 
previously noted strong tendency toward monopoly.  Accordingly, this aspect of public 
goods is not in issue, and there is not much of a case for converting the market from 
private property to a public good from an economic perspective. 
 
Nevertheless, the history of markets is a cycle of boom, scandal and bust, and given the 
great public harm that can result from these swings, there is considerable interest in 
controlling or at least minimizing the negative effects.  There have been a variety of 
approached to solving the problem of busts and scandals that have marked the financial 
markets.  In addition to the above mentioned approach of government ownership of 
markets, there are the approaches of legislation, regulation, including various forms of 
 
39 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, (1996) Law and Economics, 2nd ed.,40.  This traditional understanding 
of public good is challenged by Katharina Holzinger “The Provision of Transnational Common Goods: 
Regulatory Competition for Environmental Standards,” In Common Goods: Reinventing European and 
International Governance, ed. A. Héritier. (2001). Boulder, CO.  Holzinger is currently conducting 
research on the matter of the coordination aspects of Public Good as it concerns financial markets at the 
Max Plank.  Her study will be “The Provision of Common Goods in Multilevel Systems. Financial Markets 




self-regulation, and structural changes such as changes in governance, or more radically, 
by demutualization.  The discussion will now examine each of these approaches in turn. 
 
b) Legislation 
One very important response to the problem has been legislative reform.  This response 
has resulted in the development of a considerable amount of legislation. In fact the 
Australian answer to the boom and bust of financial markets has been a correlated boom 
of corporate and securities law.  It reached the point that the Chief Justice of the High 
Court complained that corporation’s law is incomprehensible, describing it as “a vast 
magnitude…[and of] Byzantine complexity.”41 It reflects the view that financial markets 
would be fine, says Australian scholar Schoer, “If only we could legislate away the 
gullibility of investors and financiers, and dishonest and irresponsible conduct.”42 
The problem with the legal approach is two-fold: it is impossible to develop sufficiently 
precise and comprehensive legal definitions, and such an approach causes an increase in 
strategic behaviour as parties attempt to avoid the legislation by other means.43 Clearly, 
legislating a way around such market problems is impossible, leaving the public, the 
government and the market searching for other and better ways to address the problem.  
 
A slightly less rigid, more sensitive approach than legislation is through administrative 
regulation.  Robert Cooter, the American law and economics scholar describes the 
 
41 Sir Anthony Mason 1991, “Corporate Law: the challenge of complexity,” 2(1) Australian J. of Corp. 
Law, 1.   
42 Ibid, 108. 
43 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, (2003), 329. 
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difference between law and regulation as: “regulations ideally correct failures in markets, 
laws ideally correct failures in social norms.”44 Regulations are more flexible and more 
easily amended to address issues confronting both the public interest and private interests 
in the market and its regulation.45 
c) Theories of Regulation 
Regulation is a controversial topic.  Even what is meant by regulation is disputed.  
Generally, regulation can mean any one of the following: to govern according to rules; to 
have state activity controlling markets; as one instrument of policy (as contrasted with 
incentive based instruments); and as legal rules in a command-and-control schema.46 In 
the discussion of the regulation of financial markets that follows, the term will be used in 
the second sense: that of state control of market activity. 
 
Regulation is controversial because of the philosophical commitments it reflects, not only 
with respect to economics, social policy, and social philosophy, but also because of the 
views of constitutionalism it entails.  As to the first set of disputes, scholars and 
legislators committed to neo-liberal (UK) or neo-conservative (USA) views tend to 
regard regulation with the same suspicion that they view all government.47 Those of this 
view tend to prefer leaving matters to the competitors in the marketplace to fight it out for 
themselves, trusting in the Invisible Hand to sort things out.  
 
44  Robert Cooter “Normative Failure Theory Of Law,” (1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 947, 949. 
45 Alfred C. Aman, Jr. “Administrative Law In A Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, And The 
Rise Of The Administrative Presidency” (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev. 1101, 1108 
46 T. Daintith, “The Executive Power Today: Bargaining and Economic Control”, in Jeffery Jowell and 
Dawn Oliver eds., The Changing Constitution, (1985) cited in Cosmo Graham, “Self-Regulation” in 
Genevra Richardson and Hazel Genn eds., Administrative Law and Government Action, (1994) 190, n. 4. 
47 View discussed in Craig, above n. 43, 29-38. 
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Those scholars and legislators who have a preference for a social democratic model are 
more favourably disposed toward regulation.  They believe that markets like many other 
parts of society function better with some level of regulation.48 Their discussion tends to 
focus on the level of regulation, how and by whom. 
 
Further, the issue of regulation is controversial among legal scholars because of 
constitutional commitments.  Following Dicey’s dual foundation model with its 
parliamentary or legislative supremacy and rule of law, regulation which involves the 
delegation of powers to non-parliamentary bodies is immediately problematic and 
suspect.49 Further, with the flexibility and discretion granted to some of the regulatory 
bodies, Dicey’s rule of law premise appears to be compromised.50 
The controversy concerning regulation is exacerbated by commitments to the political 
science/economic notions of Public Good on the one hand, and Public Choice theory on 
the other.  Where participants in the debate believe in such a thing as Public Good, there 
will be a concern about market failure and the belief that government intervention can 
and should correct it in order to promote the Public Good.51 By way of contrast, Public 
Choice theorists see regulation as nothing more than special interest groups rallying to 
create opportunities for themselves under the guise of “public good” and show a greater 
 
48 View discussed in Craig, ibid, 38-42. 
49 This move away from direct legislative control has prompted comment.  See, for example, Stephen 
Bottomley “Where did the law go? The delegation of Australian corporate regulation,” (2003) 15 AJCL 1 
50 Graham above n. 46, 191 and Craig, above n. 119, 4-5. 
51 A. Ogus, Regulation, Legal Form and Economic Theory, (194) ch. 3, cited in Craig above, n. 119. 
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scepticism about government intervention, claiming that government failure or regulatory 
failure is worse even than market failure.52 
Once one has made decisions concerning the above matters and has determined that 
regulation is an appropriate solution, decisions still need to be made concerning the 
empowering legislation: Will it be form-based (legal rules) regulation or economic effect-
based (out-come) regulation,53 or some newer type of regulation54 such as “beyond 
incentive” based regulation which capitalizes on parties voluntary efforts to coordinate 
and solve problems.55 And still other questions about the structure and view of the 
regulator will remain.56 For example, will the regulator be an independent agency or 
mere governmental department, or some type of an external self-funded agency?57 
52 Craig, above n. 119, 337-339. G. Brennan and J. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules, (1985), and J. 
Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (1975).  For a discussion of the problem 
of market vs. government failure in action, see Stiglitz, above n. 113, 219-20. Stiglitz also points out that 
the Public Choice theorists who dominate the IMF were demonstrably empirically wrong in addressing 
macroeconomic problems.  Ibid, 84-85. 
53 Craig, above n. 119, 329. 
54 See the sophisticated analysis of regulation particularly as it applies to environmental matters in Neil 
Gunningham, above n. 6. 
55 Discussed in Timothy Wilkins and Terrell E. Hunt, “Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory 
Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-
Agency Relationship,” (1995) 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 479., especially 492-98 et passim.  These authors note 
a newer trend in which a voluntary preventative approach is taken as opposed to correcting current known 
problems or retribution type action. 
56 The “Better Regulation Guide” (1998) of Cabinet Office of the UK identifies eleven alternatives in 
regulation: 1) do nothing: not every problem can be solved by government regulation, 2) review current 
regulation to determine whether regulation can improve or is the cause of the problem, 3) improve 
information to address information asymmetry problems, 4) introduce voluntary scheme, 5) consider code 
of practice with legal effect, 6) request industry to self-regulate, 7) use economic incentives, 8) consider 
risk-based insurance, 9) classic command and control regulation, 10) licence the problematic activity, and 
11) use international regulation.  Quoted in Craig, above n. 43, 341-2.  A broader discussion on the limits 
of regulation can be found in Ian Maitland, “The Limits of Business Self-Regulation,” (1985) 27(3) 
California Management Review 132-47. 
57 There are at least six general reasons agencies are developed:  1) as a buffer between the public interests 
and politically motivated interference from the government, 2)  escaping traditional governmental 
weaknesses, 3) bringing the appropriate specialists to the problem, 4) spread power, 5) create an smoother, 
accessible, specialized office to address matters, and 6) avoid creating too many direct bureaucrats.  
Identified by D. Hague, W. Mackenzie, and A. Barker eds., in Public Policy and Private Interests: The 
Institutions of Compromise, (1975) 362, cited in Craig, above n. 119, 92. 
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Decisions concerning the nature of the regulation and regulatory model need to be made 
to determine whether it will follow an inquisitorial or adversarial58 or ombudsman 
model,59 follow policy or address matters ad-hoc,60 and whether control of the agency 
will be ministerial or by judicial oversight.61 
Perhaps because of some of the challenges presented by the foregoing government have 
looked for alternatives to complete government control.  As one regulatory scholar 
explained, the UK government’s preference to grant self-regulatory powers to the 
financial services sector results from the fact that the task was nothing less than 
“horrifyingly complex.”62 
d) Self-regulation 
The self-regulation of financial markets is complex and has drawn mixed responses.63 
The approach of self-regulation is both reasonable and optimistic carrying with it a 
number of assumptions about the nature of markets, regulation and the motivations of 
participants.   It comes closer to some of the newer thinking in regulation noted above as 
“beyond incentive” regulation.   
 
58 Craig above n. 119, 264-5. 
59 Graham, above n. 46, 199-202. 
60 Craig, above n. 119, 331. 
61 Ibid, 345-349. 
62 Graham, above n. 46, 206. 
63 Douglas Michael, "Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-regulation as a Regulatory Technique", 47 
Administrative Law Review 171; Roberta Karmel, "Securities Industry Self-regulation — Tested by the 
Crash", 45 Washington & Lee Law Review 1297; S Miller, "Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A 
Critical Examination", 42 Washington & Lee Law Review 853; R Jennings, "Self-Regulation in the 
Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission", (1963) 29 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 663; P Grabosky, "Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory 
Compliance" (1995) 8 (4) Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 529; N 
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Self-regulation is a model that has become increasingly popular for a number of reasons.  
Although it is not a new idea, its currency has increased in recent years.  In order to 
understand it with respect to professions a brief review of its history is helpful.  Being a 
broker is both an occupation, and more recently, a profession.  The trades as occupations 
have had a tradition of self-regulation dating back as far as the guilds of the middle-
ages.64 In that era, quality of the tradesmen’s work was carefully guarded by a long 
apprentice system permitting only those who met the standards to carry on business as 
craftsmen.65 Those who could not meet those standards stayed in the workshops of 
accepted craftsmen under the supervision of those craftsmen as assistants or journeymen.   
 
In a similar manner, the professions regulated themselves.66 The earliest professions 
were those associated with the Church,67 and later with the university.68 Members of 
these institutions professed the Truth and Knowledge that had been entrusted to them. 
Over time, the more established traditions, law and medicine joined theology as 
professions.69 Each of the institutions to which the “professor” belonged regulated entry 
to the profession—by commitments to particularistic views of the Christian faith, and 
 
Gunningham, "Moving the Goalposts: Financial Market Regulation in Hong Kong and the Crash of 
October 1987" (1990) Law and Social Inquiry 1. 
64 Wilbert Moore in collaboration with Gerald Rosenblum, The Professions: roles and rules (1970) 23-51.  
Note that the recent decline in the study of professions is the result of internecine struggle in the profession 
of sociology.  Keith MacDonald, The Sociology of Professions, (1995) xi-xii. 
65 Moore ibid, 114.  See also Philip Eliot, The Sociology of the Professions, (1972), 16-24. 
66 Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (1977). 
67 Thomas Ference, Fred Goldner and R. Richard Ritti, “Priests and Church: The Professionalization of an 
Organization,” in Eliot Freidson ed. The Professions and Their Prospects (1971), 173-190, but Larson 
notes law and architecture were considered learned professions as far back as Cicero.  Larson, above n. 66, 
3. 
68 J.A. Jackson, “Professions and Professionalization—Editorial Introduction,” in J.A. Jackson, ed. 
Professions and Professionalization, Sociological Studies 3, (1970), 4 
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particular levels of education. Without these two basic competencies, one would not be 
admitted to the profession.  The professional was a special type of person who used 
his/her knowledge for the benefit of the public.70 Their knowledge was seen as a public 
good. 
 
As those most knowledgeable about the subject matter and the proper practice of their 
particular profession—not to mention the power they commanded in the status quo, and 
their tradition of self-employment71—the professions developed a tradition of self-
regulation.72 More professions have been created73—such as accounting, nursing and 
engineering, up to the latest claims of information technologists74—and each is 
clamouring for the power to self-regulate, seeing it as the golden ring of professional 
recognition.75 There is some legitimacy to the claims from these professions that they 
should be self-regulating, but self-regulation also has its drawbacks.   
 
Industries can benefit from self-regulation and even voluntary—i.e. non-governmentally 
imposed—self-regulation.  Industries are motivated to participate in self-regulation 
where, as regulation experts Gunningham and Grabosky state, “[that] minority of cases in 
which industry interest and public interest are sufficiently coincident for self-regulation 
 
69 Geoffrey Holmes, Augustan England: Professions, State and Society 1680-1730 (1982) 21, and Larson, 
above n. 66, 4-5. 
70 Eliot Freidson, “Profession and the Occupational Principle,” in Eliot Freidson ed. The Professions and 
Their Prospects (1971), 8, 27-29. 
71 Larson, above n. 66, 232-233, and Freidson, ibid, 27-34. 
72 Freidson, ibid, 34-5. 
73 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions, (1988), 3.  
74 Ibid, 216. 
75 Ibid, and Larson, above n. 66, xii. 
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to be a viable regulatory strategy.”76 Industries will do so when they face an industry-
wide problems such as: problems with public image, a lack of cheap means of protecting 
their individual image as distinct from the industry as a whole, competitive advantages 
including enhanced profits can be had from better processes, and where an industry tends 
to create social capital—that is, where an industry’s members move freely among various 
market participants, sharing technical expertise and know-how.77 It is not clear that all of 
these factors are present with the global market for financial markets, and is likely not 
even present within individual markets such as the three discussed in this paper.  Next, 
these claims for and drawbacks to self-regulation will be examined, and some 
conclusions will be drawn concerning implications for the brokerage industry and 
profession.  
 
i) Benefits of Self-Regulation78 
The benefits of self-regulation of are:  
• a voluntary relationship, meaning that a dissatisfied participant can easily 
withdraw from the profession; 
• brings knowledgeable parties to the problem of regulation and these parties are 
able to regulate with the least disruption to the market and the greatest efficiency 
• The benefit of an SRO is its proximity to the regulated parties, knowledge and 
expertise of the activities and environment in which it operates.79 
76 Gunningham, above n. 6, 159. 
77 Ibid, 159-163. 
78 This summary of benefits and drawbacks is based on Ray Schoer, “Self-Regulation and the Australian 
Stock Exchange,” Ch. 8 in Business Regulation and Australia’s Future Peter Grabosky and John 
Braithwaite (1993), 110-111 except as noted. 
79 “Chief Regulator: a discussion with NYSE CRO Rick Ketchum” Inside the NYSE on NYSE website. 
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• conscious of the costs of regulation and thus tend to avoid unnecessary regulation 
• with specific reference to self-regulation in the financial markets, the argument 
has been advanced that because of competitive pressures, the market’s rules will 
be sufficiently flexible; and 
• diversity of methods of compliance 
However, the competitive nature of trading would suggest that stock trader SRO’s will 
attempt to undermine competition within their own market where they may be offering 
similar services to corporations listed on their markets.  In addition, they will still have to 
deal with other competing stock markets. 
 
ii) Problems of Self-regulation 
While there are certainly benefits to self-regulation, there are particular drawbacks as 
well.   Generally, the main problems of self regulation are: 
• it may not cover all the participants practicing the profession, 
• it may lead to restrictive practices as the regulator develops and applies rules to 
limit competition, 
• it may not consider adequately in terms of design and implementation the interests 
of the public and third parties because of its inward focus,  
• it may be ineffective by not being sufficiently independent or seen not to be such,  
• it may not be well enough publicized to create public confidence,  
• it may not have sufficient power in terms of investigation and sanction.80 
80 Graham, above n. 6, 194-5. 
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• They may use their power to enhance their prestige instead of promoting public 
good,81 
• Protect the existing orthodoxy even where better alternatives may be available,82 
• They tend to claim excessive jurisdiction83 
• The profit motive tends to override other considerations84 
• Managers’ short-term focus impedes the longer-term thinking necessary for 
regulation,85 
• Some participants may not have resources adequate to address the issue and so 
free-ride exacerbating the collective action problem86 and 
• They may favour their larger clients.87 
Perhaps at the heart of the matter for financial markets, which are clearly exclusively for-
profit operations, is that it is unlikely that a profit inhibiting, robust interpretation of the 
regulations will be favoured over profit enhancing, minimalist interpretation of the 
regulations.88 There is no sense of public good, and so the conflict of interest between 
the public good and individual profit is often wholly overlooked or given negligible 
attention.89 
e) Co-Regulation, NDPD’s and Quangos  
 
81 Moore, above n. 64, 111. 
82 Ibid.  Stiglitz observes that large investors opposed moves to increase transparency in markets at the time 
of the Asian crisis despite the known benefits to the vast majority of the public. Stiglitz, above n. 113, 236. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Gunningham, above n. 6, 164. 
85 Ibid, 165 
86 Ibid,166 
87 Donnan, above, n. 17, 15. 
88 Ibid, 14. 
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Some of the inherent conflicts of interest resulting from self-regulation and other 
problems just noted have led governments and the regulated to look for yet other 
approaches to regulation.  A new development is the notion of co-regulation.  The idea is 
that the industry self-regulates, but does so with the participation and under the 
supervision of the government.  In many cases this may be done by setting up another 
regulatory body for the purpose: but, that body takes on a non-traditional form.90 The 
body may be a corporate or mutual body, it may or may not be government funded, it 
may be accountable to one or more government bodies directly, or none at all. In the 
United Kingdom, the structure is sometimes referred to as an NDPD (non-departmental 
public body) or a “Quango” (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation).91 These 
bodies often are both service delivery and regulatory agencies.92 An NDPD is defined as 
“a body which has a role in the processes of national government, but is not a 
government department or part of one, and which accordingly operates to a greater or 
lesser extent at arm’s length from Ministers.”93 
Co-regulatory bodies fit well in this category, as they may well be quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisations and described as non-departmental public bodies.  The 
co-regulation of stock markets permits the most important benefits of self-regulation—
knowledge, expertise, flexibility, and timeliness, while avoiding the greatest dangers 
 
89 This conflict of interest playing out in favour of the traders in an SRO financial market is precisely what 
the NASD was reprimanded for doing by the SEC.  See, Donnon, above n. 17, 10-12.  In research for the 
preparation of this paper the term “conflict of interest” appeared in only one journal article in Australia.  
90 Craig, above n. 43. 
91 Ibid.  Craig explains that the NDPD title is preferable because it more clearly identifies the governmental 
connection to the agency whereas Quango is excessively broad as a non-governmental organization can be 
nearly anything.  Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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arising from the conflicts of interest and efforts to avoid transparency and accountability.  
The NDPD allows some sense of public good to intervene in the regulatory process 
without having that intervention become overwhelming.  
 
f) Structural Approach: Demutualization 
Another important approach to regulation is a structural approach.94 Exchange structures 
can vary with respect to the role of the board and staff, powers of the executives, the 
means and influence of external bodies, voting structures, and membership rules and 
criteria.95 One interesting structural solution is demutualization.  As noted, there is a 
trend in financial markets to reformulate from member exchanges to demutualized, for-
profit corporations.  The idea behind this change of structure has been that by its structure 
a publicly traded for-profit corporation solves many of the problems of mutual 
organizations including ease of making management decisions, focusing on clear specific 
objectives, and balancing some of the power imbalances.96 In addition, publicly traded 
corporations are subject to greater disclosure obligations.   These facets in turn should 
improve transparency and when combined with an appropriate regulatory regime, such as 
co-regulation, should work to inhibit monopolistic tendencies which impair the efficiency 
of financial markets.  Very recent work by researchers Peter Swan of the University of 
 
93 Cabinet Office, Opening up Quangos, A Consultation Paper, (November, 1997), Ch. 1., para. 1, quoted 
in Craig, ibid, n. 17. 
94 Donnan, above n.17, 21. 
95 Ibid, 2. 
96 Ibid, 2-3. 
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New South Wales and Joakim Westerholm of the University of Sydney, indicate that the 
demutualized ASX has experienced just such effects.97 
Although many approaches to solving the conflicts have been made, including: enhanced 
corporate governance requirements, imposed ownership restrictions, reinforced public 
interest mandate, upgraded supervision by regulators, strengthened internal controls and 
management processes, transferred regulatory functions to an independent SRO and 
transfer regulatory functions to the Public Regulator98—it is not clear that any of these 
completely solves the problem.   
 
g) Responses of the Regulated 
An interesting analysis of industry responses to regulation, beyond the matter of 
regulatory capture noted above,99 has been developed by Peter Sandman.100 Sandman 
suggests that there are essentially three responses or stages: Stonewalling, Missionary 
Stage, and Dialogue.  In the first stage, the industry refuses to engage with the public on 
any level—it creates a strong divide, or stonewall between itself and the public.  The 
second stage, the Missionary Stage, is when the industry becomes its own advocate, 
expending efforts to convince the public of its good effect on the public good.  The final 
stage, Dialogue, is when the industry opens itself up and engages in genuine dialogue 
 
97 P. Swan and J. Westerholm, The Impact of Market Architectural Features on World Equity Market 
Performance: A Structural Equation Approach,  EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 2249  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=571441
98 Carson, above n. 11, 3. 
99 See above Section, 2 a) Financial Markets. 
100 Peter Sandman, Addressing Scepticism About Responsible Care, (1991). 
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with the public to hear and address the public’s concerns.  As we shall see, the markets 
examined in this study find themselves at different stages. 
 
h) New Directions 
Gunningham’s study of the chemical industry’s efforts at self-regulation101 may hold 
some intriguing potential for self-regulation in the brokerage industry and profession.  If 
the industry were to set up a self-regulatory body on a world-wide basis, it may be able to 
make some considerable advances in its objectives of self-regulation, improvement in the 
financial markets, and in over-all quality of markets.  Interestingly, the International 
Standards Organization’s (ISO) has just commenced examining the feasibility of 
certifying self-regulatory schemes.102 Following the ISO model, regulatory compliance 
would become part of day-to-day management practice.  The ISO model fits the financial 
market’s needs nicely as the markets recognize their need to communicate with the public 
and to varying degrees, the public interest, 103 while at the same time they desire to 
conduct their affairs without undue interference.  By taking on the ISO model, making 
regulation a management matter, it would permit the regulatory functions to be both 
spread widely and penetrate deeply in the organizational structure. 
 
As with all ISO organizations, such an organization would be purely voluntary but would 
allow the markets that choose to participate to display a symbol such as the well-
 
101 Gunningham, above n. 6, 155-186. 
102 See ISO website www.iso.org The ISO has recently considered stepping out of the narrow 
management focused initiatives to consider an ISO standard on Corporate Social Responsibility.  See, 
Working Report on Social Responsibility, ISO website. 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/info/Conferences/SRConference/pdf/Working%20Report%20on%20SR(Apr30).
pdf
103 The ISO describes itself as “A bridge between public and private sectors.”  Ibid. 
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recognized “ISO 9000”.  To obtain such a symbol, the structures and systems of checks 
and balances would have to meet a world-wide standard, which standard would have to 
be developed by both the markets themselves and outside third-parties.  The organization 
would have to publish a grade sheet on compliance, do some type of audit, publish annual 
membership lists, as well as reasons for suspension, withdrawal, expulsion and re-
admission of member markets.  As a public report card on known, world-wide, industry 
standards, which standards reach into all levels of the organization, the oversight and 
considerable assurance such an organization’s symbol would carry would be of 
considerable value to the members, the investing public, and possibly help to avoid some 
of the more egregious market disasters.  Given that some argument can be made for the 
main cause of failures is systemic and not individual,104 it may be that improved structure 
and structural analysis and monitoring would benefit all the parties even more.  
 
Having examined these various approaches to market regulation, we now turn to an 
examination of each of the three markets to see what approaches they have taken and 
what outcomes they have achieved.  Certain aspects of the markets are set out in a table 
to assist the reader in visualizing the comparison.  (See Table A) 
 
4) AUSTRALIA: THE ASX 
 
a) Historical Background 
The Australian stock market in its current form is a fairly new creature.  Although there 
was an unsuccessful attempt to start a stock brokerage in 1828 in New South Wales, it 
 
104 Gunningham, above n. 6. 
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was not until 1835 that a successful exchange brokerage existed in Australia.  That 
brokerage was transformed into the Sydney Stock Exchange in 1871.  Other exchanges 
sprang up in the capital cities of the other states and so the Australian securities markets 
were divided from 1882 until 1987.105 A particularly severe boom-and-bust cycle in 
1967-70 caused the government to reconsider its alternatives.106 At that point, the 
government decided that it would be better if there was a consolidation and as a result the 
Australian Stock Exchange was formed.  A further bust in 1987 caused further self-
examination and a new response was developed.107 As part of a global trend,108 the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) demutualized in 1998 taking on its present form.  
 
b) ASX Structure and Regulation 
Australia’s ASX is a publicly traded for profit corporation: it is listed on the market it 
operates.  Shareholders are not limited to the traditional market owners—the 
stockbrokers—but include any member of the investing public who chooses to do so 
within certain limits set out by the legislation.  The ASX corporate body provides two 
main services;109 it operates the share market, including the physical assets, IT services, 
and clearance and settlement services.  Second, it is a co-regulator, and as such, regulates 
the market.  It does so by ensuring compliance with the rules which may include 
 
105 R. Bruce, et al, Australian Corporate Finance, 3rd ed. (1988), 68. cited in Ford’s Principles of 
Corporation’s Law. 2.1.0120.  See also the discussions in Donnan, above n. 17, 13,14 and Schoer, above n. 
78. 
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid. 
108 FTSE/MV World Exchanges Report, reports that 78% of the world’s markets are corporatized. 1, 
Carson, above n. 11, 4, Angel above n. 6, 271. 
109 ASX website. 
http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/l3/ASXOverview_AS3.shtm#Market%20Integrity%20description
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scrutinizing trading activities, and by developing rules and enforcing those rules by 
penalizing those who breach them.  
 
As a for profit corporation, it has the over-riding objective of earning a profit.  Should it 
fail to do so, investors would withdraw their money, the corporation would collapse and 
investors would have to find a new market on which to trade their shares.110 An 
interesting and important element of the ASX’s corporate structure is its limit on 
shareholdings.  No individual shareholder can own or control more than five percent of 
the stock.111 
The ASX corporate structure is made up of eight directors, seven of whom are non-
executive independents.112 The offices of CEO and Chairperson of the Board are 
independent, and although Richard Humphry is both Managing Director and CEO, this is 
not considered an excessive grant of power.  ASX’s decision to separate the two positions 
complies with corporate governance best practices and precludes the CEO from 
dominating the Board of Directors.   
 
The Nominating and Remuneration Committee is made up of three non-executive, 
independent directors.113 The Audit Committee is made up of four all of whom are non-
 
110 Presumably, some creditor would step in to take up the assets and get the market operation forthwith. 
111 By Amendment SECT 766E Corporations Law Amendment (ASX) Act 1997 No. 199, 1997 - Schedule 
1--Amendment of the Corporations Law.  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/legis/cth/num%5fact/claa1997n1991997353/sch1.html?query=%22stock+exchange%22+and
+asx
112 2003 Annual Report 24-25.  The report also sets out the criteria for status as “independent” as being a 
matter of materiality and follows the criteria set out in the ASX Corporate Governance Council guidelines. 
113 Ibid, 25. 
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executive, independent directors.114 The ASX is divided into nine Operations Divisions, 
of which one, Market Integrity, is devoted to regulatory matters.115 It has a Chief 
Integrity Officer who supervises the area.116 The Financial Statements note an 
accumulated retirement benefit due and payable to the CEO in the amount of $1.9 million 
(AUD$2,798,700) for 10 years of service.117 
The ASX has recently created the ASX Corporate Governance Council with 21 
stakeholder members.118 The role of the council is to ensure that the ASX is developing 
appropriate guidelines for its members—which guidelines, presumably it will follow 
itself. 
 
In March 2001, the ASX established an independent supervisory board, the ASX 
Supervisory Review Pty Limited (ASXSR).119 It makes determinations as to whether the 
ASX is devoting sufficient resources to its regulatory role and communicates its views of 
how well the ASX is complying with its regulatory duties.120 The ASXSR currently is 
made up of four directors, has a majority of independent non-executive directors and 
meets on a bi-monthly basis.121 The ASXSR issues independent annual reports on the 
 
114 Ibid, 33. 
115 ASX website above n. 1.09.  
116 Ibid. 
117 Annual Report above n. 112, 44. 
118 Ibid. 5. 
119 ASX Supervisory Review http://www.asxsr.com.au/role.htm
120 Ibid. 
121 ASX Annual Regulatory Report 101 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/AnnualRegReport2003_ASX_ASXF.pdf
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actions of the ASX.  Its annual report is delivered to ASIC for purposes of facilitating 
ASIC’s audit.122 
The ASX reports to ASIC by means of an “Annual Regulatory Report Under Section 
792F of the Corporations Act.”123 Concerning the development of its rules, the ASX 
proposes rules which must be approved by ASIC prior to coming into force.  ASX noted 
in its 2003 Annual Report that there have been calls for releasing its market supervision 
role to outside parties; however, it has defended its maintaining of the role on the basis 
that it is “integral to our commercial and reputational [sic] success.”124 
c) Efficacy: Financial and Efficiency Results 
The ASX’s market capitalization is $910 billion (AUD $1.3 trillion).  It has 1,516 
companies listed, and has a daily average of 156 billion shares.125 Over the last 6 years 
since it demutualized—it was among the pioneers of developed exchanges in this 
regard126—the value of its stock has grown from under $5.00 per share in 1998, to over 
$15.00 in 2004.127 (See Table B)  As well, its market capitalization has grown from $409 
billion in 1999 to the $910 billion just mentioned. 
 
122 Ibid 103.  
123 Most recent report available at 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/AnnualRegReport2003_ASX_ASXF.pdf
124 Annual Report above n. 112, 5. 
125 http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/pdf/endofyear300603.pdf 
126 Donnon notes that three European exchanges were demutualized ahead of the ASX.  These were: 
Stockholm in 1993, Amsterdam in 1996, and Copenhagen in the same year.  Donnan, above n. 17, 2. 
127 Other measures of market performance such as liquidity, spreads, and historical corporate profits have 
been unavailable. The author has contacted the ASX and SGX exchanges by email to obtain this data.  
Only the NYSE has the information and so it has not been included as there is nothing for comparison.  On 
the importance and measurement of spreads, see Nicolas PB Bollen, Tom Smith, and Robert E Whaley, 
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The ASX took disciplinary action against a number of members and listed companies in 
2003. One brokerage was terminated, and disciplinary actions128 were taken in another 19 
other cases.129 In addition, it referred 58 cases to ASIC for investigation and prosecution 
where ASIC deems it desirable.130 ASX has 135 employees dedicated to regulatory 
matters and an expenditure on regulatory matters of $25 million.131 
5) SINGAPORE: THE SGX 
 
a) Historical Background 
Singapore, as part of British Malaya, has a long history of production and trading, and its 
stock broking industry developed out of this environment.  It was only relatively recently, 
in 1930, however, that the stockbrokers organized and registered themselves as the 
Singapore Stockbrokers Association under the Societies Act.132 The market operated 
independently of the government.  Despite joining and later separating from Malaysia, 
the nation of Singapore kept its stock market joined to Malaysia’s until 1973.  In that 
year, the Stock Exchange of Singapore Ltd. was incorporated, and operated as a self-
regulating organization under the Securities Industry Act 1973.
“Modeling the bid/ask spread: measuring the inventory-holding premium,” (2004) 72 (1) J. of Financial 
Economics 97. 
128 Disciplinary actions counted here do not including letters issued to warn members of their actions, but 
which carry no penalties. 
129 ASX Annual Regulatory Report above n. 46, 93-95.  
130 Annual Report above n. 115, 19. 
131 Ibid.  Stephen Yan of the Corporate Communications Dept of the ASX indicated that there are 85-89 
staff in the Market Integrity division, but that nearly all employees have some regulatory functions. Email 
correspondence with the author, June 18, 2004. 
132 Walter Woon, “Securities Regulation in Singapore” in Butterworths Handbook of Singapore Securities 
Law, (1998) Walter Woon ed., 1. 
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As a result of a dramatic corporate collapse,133 the government stepped in and in 1986 the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) became the regulator, although the day to day 
supervision was still left to the exchange itself.134 The arrangement is the more 
traditional government regulatory agency private regulated industry schema.  The 
Securities Industry Act is complemented by the Companies Act as the other main piece of 
legislation governing securities in Singapore.  The exchange has three boards of 
companies: one for listed companies meeting all the listing requirements, one for 
companies with good prospects and likely to meet the full listing requirements, and one 
for companies that are foreign and have good prospects.135 
b) SGX Structure and Regulation 
The Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX) in its current form, is a relatively new exchange.  
It is the product of a merger between the Stock Exchange of Singapore and the Singapore 
International Monetary Exchange.  The merger was a demutualization of the two prior 
exchanges and occurred in 1999.136 It has been a listed for-profit corporation since 
November 2000. The SGX has co-trading linkages with the ASX and is looking to link its 
cash and derivative markets, possibly with Tokyo.137 
The SGX corporate is made up of 12 directors, 10 of whom are non-executive.138 The 
offices of CEO and Chairperson are separate.139 This division facilitates the supervisory 
 
133 In December 1985, the Singapore and Malaysian exchanges were closed for three days following the 
collapse of Pan-Electric Industries.  Woon, ibid, 2. 
134 Ibid 2. 
135 Ibid 3. 
136 SGX website. http://info.sgx.com/SGXWeb_CORPCOM.nsf/DOCNAME/SGX_Corporate_Information
137 Monetary Authority of Singapore website.  
138 SGX website above n. 136. 
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role of the Board of Directors by preventing the CEO from dominating the Board of 
Directors.  The SGX does not have an independent supervisory board.140 Hsieh Fu Hua, 
the Chairman of the SGX, earned just under $1.0 million and sees his job as a national 
service.141 The SGX notes that on retirement, the CEO will be entitled to a minimum of 
2 million share options for each year of service.142 The Compensation Committee is 
composed by seven members and is made up entirely of directors from the Board of 
Directors and includes six independent non-executive directors.  Its Audit Committee of 
six is made up entirely of independent non-executive directors.143 The SGX does not 
release information about the number or people engaged in regulatory matters or market 
oversight.  Nor does it disclose information about its budget for these matters.144 
The SGX’s regulator’s powers are vast.  The regulator, MAS, operates as the de facto 
central bank of Singapore, and in relation to securities regulation, has complete power to 
obtain whatever information it desires about any and all traders, dealers and investors 
who buy or sell on the exchange.145 There is no confidentiality whatsoever between 
brokers and clients.146 MAS licenses all market participants, is the review board for all 
actions by the exchange against market actors, must approve all rules, may prohibit 
trading in any security it believes may cause risks to individuals, or for public interest 
 
139 CEO is Hsieh Fu Hua and Chairperson is J Y Pillay. 
140 These regulatory activities are supervised by the manager charged with the area of “Risk Management & 
Regulation.”  http://info.sgx.com/SGXWeb_CORPCOM.nsf/DOCNAME/Background_On_SGX
141 “Hsieh's SGX: Role model for the NYSE,” (Oct 2003), 28(10), Institutional Investor-International 
Edition, 8. 
142 SGX Annual Report 2003 Note 12 to Financial Statements, 98. 
143 SGX Summary Annual Report 2003, 68, 71, and 75. 
144 Email correspondence with Kim Hok of the SGX, June 14, 2004. 
145 Woon, above n. 132, 3. 
146 Ibid 4. 
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concerns, and make regulations concerning practices it considers deceptive or 
manipulative.147 
Although SGX is not a governmental agency,148 MAS and the SGX cooperate in 
developing the market.  For example, MAS and SGX invested some $4.2 million USD 
for purposes of improving the securities and derivatives trading in the market.149 
As part of its regulatory activities, the SGX used to conduct annual on-site inspections of 
all members.  In April, 2003, MAS rescinded certain regulatory powers from the SGX 
including the annual on-site inspection of brokers which MAS took on as its own 
responsibility.  The government announcement claims the step was taken “to provide 
greater clarity in regulatory responsibilities.”150 The SGX’s current regulatory activities 
include requiring all its members to file annual audited statements, and monitoring 
market activity.151 Finally, SGX monitors members’ financial strength.  Power to control 
the securities market is primarily via the previously mentioned Companies Act, and the 
Listing Rules of the Exchange.   
 
The SGX has two main business units—Markets and Operations—which are subdivided 
into five sub-units: Markets, Products & Services, Strategy & Business Development, 
 
147 Ibid 4. 
148 Ibid 3, The 2000 restructuring does not appear to have changed this aspect of the SGX. 
149 Reported in “SGX, MAS to further develop securities, derivatives industry,”  Xinhua (China), Jun 23, 
2003 Business Source Premier database.  The SGX mentions this change and states that it is beneficial as it 
reduces its costs.  2003 Annual Report above n. 141. 
150 “MAS Takes over on-site inspection function from SGX” 
www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1MAS_Takes_Over_On_Site_Inspection_Function_from_SGX_24_April
_2003.htm last visited June 4, 2004 
151 SGX website. 
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Operations, and Technology.  In addition, it has two other branches, Corporate Services 
and Risk Management. 
 
c) Efficacy: Financial and Efficiency Results 
The SGX’s market capitalization is $223 billion ($S383 billion).  It has 551 companies 
listed, and has a daily average turnover of about 57.4 billion shares.  Over the last four 
years since it demutualized, its market capitalization grew from $192 billion in 
November 2001, to its current $223 billion capitalization just mentioned.152 Its 
profitability as a listed company has grown with its revenues and profits increasing year 
over year from 1998 when the Straits Times Industrial Index was at 885,153 to the merger 
of 2000, the Index grew to about 1,900.154 It stands at a level of 1,825 in 2004.155 Since 
SGX’s opening at $0.7855 in December 2000, the share price has increased modestly to 
$0.9251, as of June, 2004. (See Table C). 
 
In 2003, the SGX took 10 regulatory actions against members and listed companies.156 
The details of each action are published on the website giving at least the impression of a 
high level of transparency to its internal regulatory action. 
 
152 SGX Prices, shares, statistics 
http://info.sgx.com/webmktstatistics.nsf/0b0324dae84b770948256dad0009440a/b20be0fb4de8b02148256b
3a0030e665?OpenDocument last visited June 4, 2004 
153 Business Times Asia Straits Times Index http://business-
times.asia1.com.sg/mnt/html/btstatic/stindex/welcome.html 
154 Daily Straits Times Index from 1985  http://business-
times.asia1.com.sg/mnt/html/btstatic/stindex/ST%20Index%20roll%20back%20values.xls last visited June 
4, 2004 
155 Straits Times as at June 6, 2004. 
156 SGX website, Disciplinary Action initially listed no regulatory action for 2003.  
http://info.sgx.com/RMRDisciplinary.nsf/VCirculars_ST?OpenView But on June 11, 2004 ten actions 
were listed 
http://info.sgx.com/RMRDisciplinary.nsf/VCirculars_ST?OpenView&Start=1&Count=30&Expand=1#1
last visited June 4, 2004 
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6) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE NYSE 
 
a) Historical Background 
The NYSE dates back to 1792.  Throughout its history is has been a mutual company.  As 
such, the NYSE is a private organization and not required to be open about its affairs.  In 
response to the Crash of 1929, the USA government stepped in to regulate the market by 
the creation of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).  The NYSE was registered as 
a national securities exchange in 1934157 and continues to be subject to the government 
regulator in the traditional government agency regulator and private regulated party 
schema.   
 
The SEC administers seven pieces of legislation158 the most important of which are: 
Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Its objectives are “that investors receive financial and other significant information… and 
[to] prohibit deceit, misrepresentations and other fraud in the sale of securities.”159 Its 
primary approach is through the registration process requiring the filing of prospectuses 
with the usual disclosure requirements.160 The SEC has jurisdiction with respect to the 
regulation of brokers, transfer and clearing agents, and the various exchanges in the USA.  
In response to the most recent string of scandals, starting with Enron, Worldcom and 
 
157 NYSE www.nyse.com . last visited June 4, 2004. 





Adelphia, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It is a detailed, rule oriented, 
micromanaging piece of legislation.161 
b) NYSE Structure and Regulation 
The NYSE as a mutual organization is owned by the members, the majority of whom are 
brokers.  As of December 30, 2003 there were 1,366 members with distributive rights—
i.e. rights to distributions of equity162—of which 957 were leased to Lessee members, 29 
electronic access members, and 4 physical access members for a total of 1,399.163 
As of 2003, the NYSE has a dual board structure.  Although the NYSE started in 1938 
with a large board, having some 33 members on the Board of Governors, in 2003 that 
Board was replaced with a Board of Directors, all independents, and a Board of 
Executives, comprised of “constituents” or stakeholders.164 The Board of Directors has 
between 6 and 12 members in addition to the CEO and Chairman.165 The current board 
has 10 members.166 The CEO and Chair positions have been separated after the Grasso 
scandal.   
 
The NYSE has a staff of 650.167 It is increasingly looking to strengthen its regulatory 
ability via technology.168 The NYSE is the Designated Examining Authority, appointed 
 
161 For a general criticism and caution concerning the effects of this legislation, see Larry E Ribstein 
“Implications Of Sarbanes-Raising The Rent On Us Law” (2003) 3(2) J. Of Corp. Law Studies 299 
162 identified as “distributive rights” in the NYSE Annual Report 2003, note on New Equity Members, 50. 
163 Ibid. 
164 NYSE website, “Historical”  
165 NYSE Annual Report, above n. 85, “Report to the members by the Chairman [sic]” 2. 
166 2003 Annual Report above n. 85, 42. 
167 “Chief Regulator: a discussion with NYSE CRO Rick Ketchum” Inside the NYSE on NYSE website. 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/fullbook.pdf
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by the SEC, to supervise and regulate its members.  It runs programs on all its members’ 
mandatory financial filings, has annual examination of members’ books, requires annual 
independent audits of all members that deal with the public, and reviews complaints filed 
by the public.169 
The USA system requires every rule to be pre-approved by the SEC.  The rule approval 
process by the SEC has been described as: 
proposed rule changes are first published in the Federal Register.  Then there is a 
public comment period which provides full employment for lobbyists.  The 
lobbyists from an SRO’s competitors attempt to convince the SEC and the US 
Congress that the proposed rule change would lead to the end of civilisation as we 
know it, and that a different rule change should be adopted by the allegedly  
‘self’-regulatory organization.  Meanwhile, the understaffed and under funded 
SEC won’t approve the SRO rules until the SRO amends the rule filing into the 
exact form that the SEC wants.170 
This description is hardly a comforting, confidence building description; purported to be 
“the envy of the world.”171 
The Grasso Affair has not left the NYSE untouched.  In fact, a considerable proportion of 
the NYSE Annual Report 2003 chairman’s message as well as the CEO’s message are 
dedicated to reforms to recoup the damage to the NYSE’s reputation and restore lost 
investor confidence, which resulted from Grasso’s compensation.  The NYSE claims it 
referred the matter to the Attorney General of New York.  This step, however, does sound 
a bit ingenuous.  The NYSE failed to disclose the complete compensation package until 
 
168 Ibid. 
169 NYSE Safety of Customer Assets NYSE website. 
170 Angel above n. 6, 277. 
171 Ibid. 
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the SEC applied pressure, after which the exchange revealed it will pay an additional $48 
million in the future.172 Furthermore, why did it not pursue the matter itself, seems to be 
the natural question, as it would have the best standing in an action against the former 
chair. 
 
The NYSE reports that it brought 231 cases against members resulting in $12.6 million in 
disciplinary fines, six enforcement actions for insider trading, and it played a key role in 
the investment banking global settlements173 of several billion dollars.  Still, the SEC is 
asking why the NYSE was slow in detecting problems, including Grasso’s pay.  The 
NYSE’s response has been a corporate governance solution, namely separating out the 
regulatory function making it completely independent of the market activities.174 
There has been pressure on the NYSE to demutualize,175 in part because of Grasso’s 
exorbitant compensation package.  The idea would be that a demutualization would 
increase public scrutiny, by increasing transparency and accountability.  The NYSE’s 
response to date, however, has been related to corporate governance—splitting the Chair 
and CEO roles176—and disclosure concerning executive compensation.177 The SEC 
approved rules increasing the number of independent directors to a majority of the board, 
and rules by which the nominating, compensation and audit committees must be 
 
172 Hugo Dixon, “Feet in Mouth” 10 Sept., 2003, Breaking News.
173 Annual Report, above n. 85, “NYSE Regulation Report” 6. 
174 Ibid.  This approach is strongly supported by its members, with 93% voting in favour of the change.  
Annual Report above n. 85. 
175 Andrei Postelnicu, “NYSE Faces pressure to demutualise,” 7 Sept. 2003, NY Times.
176 The split is not a permanent feature of the NYSE.  It stems specifically from the Grasso affair.  “Report 
to the Members by the Chairman,” NYSE Annual Report 2003, above n. 85, 2. 
177 “Chief Regulator: a discussion with NYSE CRO Rick Ketchum” above n. 79.  See also, Postelnicu ibid. 
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composed entirely of independent directors.178 Because of the SEC’s ability to 
recommend rules, it is unclear whether these changes to the rules came at the initiative of 
the NYSE, or from the SEC.  The interplay between regulator and regulated even as a 
self-regulating body can get overrun, and at least one expert claims that the NYSE is only 
nominally “self” regulating.179 The most critical issue is who regulates the trades and it 
would appear that the NYSE continues to do so.  Still, the new CEO, John Thain has 
stated that the SEC is in danger of over-regulating the market.  He suggests that the 
balance between “regulation and accountability versus growth and competitiveness” are 
being tipped too much toward the former.180 This statement is rather surprising given the 
NYSE’s recent struggles to regain confidence as a result of the largest scandals in 
corporate history in addition to the Grasso affair. 
 
As a result of its corporate governance changes, the NYSE separated its regulatory 
function from its market function.181 Its Chief Regulatory Officer (CRO) reports directly 
to the Regulatory Oversight & Regulatory Budget Committee, which is composed 
exclusively of independent directors.  The NYSE’s CRO sees the issues facing capital 
markets as being best addressed by self-regulation and a completely independent 
regulatory structure within the SRO.   
 
178 NYSE Annual Report, above n. 85, 2, See commentary by Adrian Michaels, “SEC to approve listing 
requirements,” 7 Sept. 2003. 
179 Angel above n. 6, 277. 
180 May 27, 2004 Remarks to the Economic Club of New York City, NYSE article. 
181 NYSE website Market Regulation 
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Except for the CEO, all directors are outside and independent.182 The Board of Directors, 
(BoD) is charged with responsibility for being “accountable to member owners and the 
public, the fiduciary, regulatory oversight [and] ultimately responsibility for the 
NYSE.”183 The Board of Directors has four Board Committees: Regulatory Oversight & 
Regulatory Budget Committee; Human Resources and Compensation Committee; 
Regulation, Enforcement & Listing Standards Committee; Nominating and 
Compensation Committee; and Audit Committee.  All board members except for the 
Chairman act on the Compensation and Nomination Committees.  The Audit Committee 
is composed of three outside, independent directors.184 It has 560 employees dedicated to 
regulatory matters but does not disclose its regulatory expenditure. 
 
The newly created Board of Executives is a broader board, composed of stakeholders and 
was founded as an effort to stay engaged with the financial community and “to include 
additional public and private buy-side representatives, as well as lessor [sic] 
members.”185 The Board of Executives is appointed by the BoD and is to meet at least 
six times per year.  Its responsibilities are; 
engagement with BOD and management; advisory on NYSE operations; advisory 
on NYSE evolution within contract of market structure and performance 
discussion; advisory on public spokesman role of the NYSE and its Chair and 
CEO, and recommends the non-regulatory operating budget of the BOD.186 
c) Efficacy: Financial and Efficiency Results 
 
182 2003 Annual Report above n. 85, 2. 
183 Ibid, 44.  
184 Ibid, 44. 
185 Ibid, 2. 
186 Ibid, 44. 
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The NYSE’s market is $17.3 trillion.  It has an average daily volume of 1.4 billion shares 
valued at $38.5 billion.187 The NYSE spreads have narrowed significantly between 1996 
and 2002.  The NYSE has not been all success, and in fact, has lost listings to some of its 
competitors.188 (See Table D). 
 
7) CONCLUSION  
 
The stock exchanges discussed in this paper, although facing the same challenge of 
providing a financial market which successfully balances the demands of capital 
consumers and capital providers, have developed differently in many ways.  They differ 
most in term of the role of the regulator and how the regulator should be best involved—
whether inside as a participant in the market enterprise as in the Singaporean model, as a 
quasi-participant co-regulator as in the Antipodean model, or a fully external body as in 
the American model.  As to structure, the options appear to be somewhat limited: co-
operative market or for-profit corporation.  As may be expected, the rules are not 
radically different as they are attempting to accomplish the same thing.   
 
From our examination of the three exchanges, it is clear that the NYSE model remains a 
labyrinthine, medieval affair, with committees and boards arranged, responsible and 
reporting in a confusing array.  As a private, members only club, it cannot but be 
expected to continue to stumble through other Grasso Affair type problems.  It lacks the 
 
187 Annual Report 2003 above n. 85, “Operating Report.” 
188 NYSE declined in its market share from 83.6% in 2002 to 81.5% in 2003.  Annual Report2003 
“Operating Report,” James Glassman, “NASDAQ vs. NYSE: Stock Trading Transformed by Technology 
and Competition,” 12 Jan., 2004 Capitalism Magazine.
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external accountability of a publicly traded for-profit and it lacks transparency.189 
Furthermore, it has no sense of public good.  
 
The ASX is a step ahead of the NYSE.  Its independent Supervisory Board with its 
annual audited reporting to the government and its publicly traded structure gives it a 
considerably higher level of transparency and accountability.  It appears to be a clearly 
set up and well-designed co-regulatory schema. The government’s interest and 
involvement in the operation and regulation of the market is much clearer than that of the 
NYSE.  Nevertheless, the conundrum is that ASX’s profit making activity includes its 
activity as being the regulator enforcing its rules.190 As regulator, the ASX’s objective is 
to exercise an element of control over market participants—including itself—to create an 
efficient, transparent market.  It must do this without regard to the financial 
consequences.  But this highlights the very problem confronted by the ASX and indeed 
all co-regulatory and self-regulatory markets.  On the one hand, to be successful in its 
corporate objective as a listed company both profitable and carrying out its corporate 
mission, the ASX must protect the market’s reputation for fair, efficient and honest 
operations, of both itself and of the market’s market participants by enforcing the rules. 
On the other hand, its corporate objective of staying financially sound precludes it from a 
robust enforcement of those very rules.191 This problem is not merely hypothetical: the 
ASX has been reluctant to take legal action against companies which it believes should 
 
189 See Swan, above n. 97. 
190 Board above n. 16 et al note that this tendency toward for profit exchanges has decreased interest in 
regulatory functions 12.  
191 Donnan, above n. 17, 14. 
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be prosecuted for fear of retaliatory litigation which may result in a very significant 
damage award if successful.192 
In some ways, the most convincing model is the SGX, where the government’s hand in 
the market has made it perfectly clear that financial markets play an important role in the 
public good.  Even its chairman, as noted above, sees his job as a public service.  In 
addition, the SGX benefits from its status as a publicly traded for-profit corporation, 
monitored carefully by MAS.  Unfortunately, it is not clear why MAS took back member 
auditing responsibilities.  Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether the SGX’s 
auditing was sufficient, and whether rescinding the power is good or not.  In any event, 
investors and other participants in the market can have confidence, backed by the 
Singapore government’s strong reputation in finance that the market is being run well.193 
Still, the level of scrutiny of trades and trades available to the government, and that 
governments have their own problems with corruption could certainly cause some 
investors to avoid the SGX. 
 
In terms of Sandman’s three stages of regulatory response, we can see that the NYSE 
appears to be stuck at stonewalling moving sometimes to missionizing.  This position is 
manifest in the CEO’s report which focuses on buffing the image of the NYSE while not 
making the good corporate governance changes permanent or seeking independent input.  
The ASX and the SGX have moved to at least the missionary stage, and given the 
 
192 Schoer, above n. 78, 112.  Schoer also notes that ASX claims to spend about $5 million annually in 
enforcement of the rules without specifying what counts as an enforcement expense, 111. 
193 The Singapore government takes equity positions in many corporations traded on the market.  Normally, 
those companies with government involvement trade at a premium because of that involvement. 
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pressure of the government regulators and the disclosure requirements of public 
companies, they appear to be held at or close to a dialogue stage. 
 
In the last few years, the markets themselves have remarkably similar trajectories in 
terms of equity growth (See Table D).  Furthermore, the incorporated markets have 
reasonably similar levels of profit.   
 
Given that many of the changes to the rules and structures have only been recent, and that 
there has been considerable volatility in the global economy which has only begun to 
recover from its most recent recession, it is exceedingly difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusions about which system or structure is better.  For these reasons it is difficult to 
develop a correlation between structural and regulatory matters with economic and 
financial performance of markets, although Swan and Westerholm’s research certainly 
provides intriguing indications.194 One would expect these changes and structures to 
show over time the superiority of one market over another.  And while there are certainly 
a multitude of other factors effecting a market’s growth, there can be little doubt about 
the importance of a market’s structure and regulation in developing its reputation and 
consequently, its utility in providing capital for producers and enticing investment 
opportunities for investors.  Several years will need to pass and careful monitoring of the 
situation will have to take place before such a study can be conducted.  Nevertheless, this 
paper highlights the possibility, direction and general shape such a study could take. 
 
194 See above n. 97. 
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What is clear is that human nature is not likely to change and that while markets and their 
regulators need to be diligent in minimizing opportunity for deceitful behaviour, there 
will always be those participants who will seek and find the openings permitting them to 
exploit other participants in the market.  Indeed, it may not be too much to say that the 
basic strategy of all the participants in the market is just that: to be just one step ahead of 
everyone else in order to exploit those without the tiny edge just discovered by the 




Table A:  Market Finance and Corporate Comparison 
 
Comparison of Exchanges
Source: 2003 Annual Reports    
(All figures in millions)
(All dollars = USD)  
ASX NYSE SGX
MARKET
Capitalization 900 17,300 821
Total Share Volume-daily 156,000 352,000 113,000
Listed Companies(x1) 1,515 2308 551
CORPORATE
Operating Revenue 143 1,074 127
Profit 40.2 90 30
CEO Compensation 0.9 130+ 1.0** 
Cash on hand 60.6 800* 129
Regulatory expenditure 25 *** *** 
Regulatory employees 135 560 *** 
 Regulatory Actions 20 231              0 
** source see n. 148 above    
* Cash on hand prior to    *** indicates 
Grasso payout (Source: information 




Table B: ASX 
 
54
Table C: SGX 
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Table D: NYSE195 
195 All comparisons in this paper dealing with the NYSE have dealt with DJI as if it were a complete index 
and representative of the NYSE.  This decision was made because of lack of alternative sources of 
information and as a best substitute.  
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Table E: Comparison of Growth of Markets 
 
